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largely because he was known to be in general agreement with
Pestalozzi's methods; and the pedagogical part of his duties
always received special attention from him. Not only did he
lecture on education,'but he established a demonstration school
(which developed into a training college), to supplement the
lecture course. In this school, his idea of a twofold course—of
mathematics, to give a training in the observation of natural facts,
and of the classics, beginning with Homer's Odyssey, to cultivate
the human sympathies—was put into practice. He himself gave
mathematical lessons in the presence of the students, and met
them at a weekly conference on school work. In 1833 he returned
to Gottingen, and there spent the last years of his life. Among
the few works written by him during this period was a restatement
of his educational principles under the title Outlines of Pedagogical
Lectures, in which the doctrines of his General Pedagogy were
brought more explicitly into relation with his psychology. He
died in the midst of his labours in 1841.

Herbart's philosophy is somewhat misleadingly called realism;
but it is not realism in any proper sense of the term, since he does
not think that any of the things known to us are real or that their
real nature can ever be known. He is only a realist in so far as he
believes that there is reality—unknowable reality—behind the
appearance of things, and that by way of interpreting the facts of
experience it is permissible to postulate the existence of simple
entities or " reals/' about which all that can be said is that they
exist and that they are manifold. But though these entities are
not in space and are not forces, we can think of them, if we choose,
as if they were forces interacting in a kind of " ideal" or " intelli-
gible " space. That, according to Herbart, is the most adequate
way of representing them to ourselves. This hypothesis applies
as much to our experience of our own mental states as to our
experience of objects. " The simple nature of the soul is totally
unknown and will for ever remain so." * What we call the soul, the
soul that manifests itself in time, is not the real soul, but " only
the sum of the actual presentations" or mental states which
have come through individual experience. About the origin of
these presentations it is impossible to say more than that they
are the product of the reaction of the unknowable real soul on the
unknowable real things. From this it follows that the presentations

* LMuch *tr Psychology, iii, 153,   English translation by Smith $< ;*o.